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bstract: This paper1 reconstitutes
and addresses critically the deonto-
logical and consequentialist argu-
ments given by the French government to
justify the denial of the national guaranteed
minimum income support (RSA) to young
people under 25 years old. The deontological
arguments express a concern for distributive
 justice and suggest that young people do not
 deserve income support. The consequentialist
arguments, on the other hand, emphasise social
eﬃciency: they draw on the alleged negative
outcomes that the extension of income support
to young people would bring about. After ana-
lysing each argument, this paper concludes that
the denial of RSA to young people is an illegi-
timate discrimination. It then proposes that we
understand our duties towards young people
through an account of prudence that reconciles
both (1) concerns of distributive justice with
concerns for social eﬃciency and (2) concerns
for inter- and intragenerational justices.
Introduction
In June 2009, the Sarkozy government re-
formed the “Revenu Minimum d’insertion”
(RMI), which was the French guaranteed
minimum income support (eﬀective since
1988), and implemented a new scheme
 called RSA “Revenu de solidarité active”.
Just like the former RMI, this new plan in-
cluded a monthly allowance (of about €460)
for those without any source of income.
 How ever, as opposed to the former RMI, it
also made provisions for a second allowance
to top up the income of the low-paid. As a
result, the government claimed that it would
incentivise work rather than inactivity.2
In the initial proposal, young adults bet-
ween 18 and 25 years old were ineligible for
RSA,3 just as they were excluded from the
former RMI. According to the Haute Auto-
rité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour
l’Egalité – the French Equal Opportunities
and Anti-Discrimination Commission –
such diﬀerential treatment was discrimina-
tory. The inequality of treatment was based
on age – a criterion prohibited by the law –
and it deprived young people of an impor-
tant social right.4
As a response, President Nicolas Sarkozy
introduced a new scheme in September
2009 entitled “RSA-jeunes” (RSA-youth)
aimed at young people between 18 and 25
years old. However, as its name suggests,
RSA-jeunes is diﬀerent from the original
RSA. It requires a past contribution: young
people are only entitled to income support if
they have worked full-time for two years in
the past three. Initially, 160,000 young
people5 were supposed to receive this new al-
location, which represented only 2% of
young people, while approximately 20% of
them lived under the poverty line, and while
more than 23% of active young people were
unemployed.6 Today, over a year after its
 oﬃcial launch, the situation is even worse:
only about 10,000 young people receive
RSA-jeunes, while over one million people
aged between 18 and 25  live under the pov -
erty line.7 French youth unemployment is,
on average, more than twice as high as the
national (9.3%) and the OECD (8.5%)8
unemployment rate.
In this paper, I aim at presenting the
 justifications that were given for the denial
of the original RSA to young people and for
the implementation of the very restrictive
RSA-jeunes instead. There was a critical lack
of governmental publications justifying the
practice,9,10 which is unacceptable given
what is at stake. Drawing mainly on the in-
troductory speech for RSA-jeunes by Presi-
dent Sarkozy and from scholars who
questioned age requirements for minimum
income, I have tried to reconstitute a taxo-
nomy of the underpinning premises
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 accounting for the diﬀerential treatment. I
do not wish to quibble about the numbers:
25 years old may be too old, and two years
of work may be too much, yet the general
principles symbolised by such numbers may
still be valuable. It is my aim that the chal-
lenges raised by the assessment of these prin-
ciples go beyond a mere critique of this
specific governmental policy. In fact, I be-
lieve that a careful analysis will help us un-
derstand how policies aimed at young
people tend to become too restrictive and
short-sighted. 
According to Mongin,11 the authorities
denied the original means-tested RSA to
young people in the name of both “(1) dis-
tributive justice and (2) social eﬃciency”.12 I
have been able to identify at least three
 arguments in each of these two fields. The
first three arguments are concerned with
“distributive justice” and are deontological:
they state that young people do not deserve
income support. On the other hand, the
three arguments of “social eﬃciency” are
consequentialist arguments concerned with
the outcomes that an extension of income
support to young people would bring about.
Here is a table of my understanding of
these arguments:
Deontological arguments
According to Sarkozy, RSA ought to be
 allocated to those “who deserve it”.13 Fein-
berg explains that desert involves a deserving
subject and a desert basis: “judgements of
desert carry with them a commitment to the
giving of reasons. If a person is deserving of
some sort of treatment, he must, necessarily,
be so in virtue of some possessed character -
istics or prior activity.”14 By denying the
 original RSA to young people, the govern-
ment claims that young people in general
(subject) do not deserve RSA (object). Yet,
what desert basis can explain such judge-
ments? In other words, what criteria under-
pin the de facto division between deserving
and undeserving subjects imposed by the
RSA?
Wim van Oorschot has identified five
criteria of deservingness:15 (1) control, that is
people’s power and responsibility over their
situation; (2) need, that is the degree of
 deprivation of the person; (3) identity, that
is the intensity of the proximity people feel
towards the recipients; (4) attitude, that is
the degree of gratefulness or docility; (5)
 reciprocity, the extent to which the person
contributes.16 These criteria can help in
 reconstituting three desert-based arguments
For the purpose of this paper, I will not
 analyse each of these arguments in depth.
 How ever, I will still introduce them all briefly
and try to point out where I believe they fail.
that could justify the diﬀerential treatment
between under and over 25 years old citizens.
Needs-based argument
The framing of RSA-jeunes reveals that the
French government believes that young
people’s needs matter less than those of older
adults, mostly because they can rely on their
family. This reasoning explains why most be-
nefits aimed at young people are allocated
through their parents by a system of tax
 deduction. However, the needs-based argu-
ment can easily be dismissed because as a
matter of fact, not all families provide for
their young adult members. If we really care
about addressing genuine needs, RSA
should be allocated to young people whose
families do not provide for their primary
needs. It is true that young people are often
dependent on their families and are thus
 generally less in need of a minimum income
than adults. However, some young people
need it just as much because they are de-
pendent on a poor family. A study from the
Secours Catholique has shown that disad-
vantaged families see an income decrease of
25% when they have to care for one young
adult, and single mothers an income de-
crease of 33%.17 Disadvantaged families and
their young adult members are at risk of  fall -
ing into a vicious cycle of poverty. Thus, just
like a non-working spouse is denied RSA if
and only if he or she has access to a rich
enough partner, it seems that a young person
should be denied RSA if and only if he or
she depends on a rich enough household.
There are no convincing needs-based reasons
for denying RSA to at the least needy young
people.
Reciprocity argument
The reciprocity argument appeals to the idea
that people ought to contribute to society’s
well-being if they are to expect the  com mun -
ity to provide for their subsistence when
they are vulnerable. This is the idea under-
pinning the backward-looking requirement
that young people must work for at least two
years before they can claim income support.
Contribution is understood as giving rise to
entitlements. As Cummiskey puts it, desert
as entitlement provides “the basis for a plau-
sible account of the nature of backward-
 looking reasons, which are constitutive of
some institutions”.18 The requirement of a
past contribution derives from the principle
of reciprocity, described by Stuart White in
the following way: “if one willingly enjoys
the fruits of one’s fellow citizens’ labour,
then as a matter of justice one ought to
 provide some appropriate good or service in
return.”19
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Deontological arguments (three desert
basis: need, contribution and eﬀort)
- The “needs-based argument”:
Young people have smaller “needs” which
can be met by their family; thus more
 restrictive requirements can justly be
 applied to them.
- The “reciprocity argument”:
Young people are not “contributors”;
thus they should not be entitled to
 income support unless they have already
worked.
- The “meritocratic argument”:
Young people have made relatively less
“eﬀorts” than adults in their lives; thus
they do not deserve a reward, apart from
those who have worked.
Figure 1: Taxonomy of the arguments supporting more restrictive income support for young people
Consequentialist arguments
- The “paternalistic argument”:
Work is essential to people’s happiness
and wellbeing; thus, it should be incen-
tivised in general, and more so among
young people.
- The “dependence argument”:
The phenomenon of dependence on ben-
efits is particularly problematic among
young people (emphasis on youth beha-
viour); thus more incentives on work in
order to avoid dependence are legitimate.
- The “responsibility argument”:
Promoting a sense of responsibilities
among young people is fundamental;
thus the government should not give
them something for nothing.
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However, this argument is not suﬃcient
to justify  RSA being denied to many needy
young people for two main reasons. First,
even if we agree that participation ought to
be a requirement, there is no reason why
paid employment should be the only  accept -
able form of contribution. What about
 volunteering, caring, interning or even
 study ing? Are these not legitimate activities
for citizens under 25 years old? Perhaps
 studying is less straightforwardly conceived
as a societal contribution than paid employ-
ment or volunteering. However, even though
higher education is a personal investment, it
is clear that it has a great impact on how well
the society as a whole ends up faring in
terms of skills, knowledge, technology and
culture. Thus, even if  education is a less
 direct societal contribution, it clearly is a
considerable long-term investment in
 society as a whole. 
Second, even if we agree with White that
justice requires that someone who receives
benefits oﬀers something in return, it is not
clear why this contribution should be
 required as a past pre-requisite. It seems that
discourses tend to confuse reciprocity with
utility: reciprocity is not restricted to parti-
cipation in insurance schemes. These  schemes
are just one way to promote reciprocity and
maximize utility. In the case of retirement
pensions, people are indeed required to con-
tribute before they benefit, since they are
 likely to be unable to work after a certain
age; the retirement system is conceived so
that it fits utility. So, indeed, the young have
not made payments into social insurance
yet. But that is not relevant to reciprocity.
Since young people have a long working-life
ahead of them, forward-looking contribu -
tions should not be problematic. Recipro-
city rests on a willingness to be part of the
social fabric. A retiree displays it by pointing
at past achievements; a young person
 displays it by her intention, in a forward-
 looking way, to reciprocate, by a willingness
to work, to study, etc.
Meritocratic argument
The meritocratic argument is based on the
24
idea that an individual’s merit is a fair basis
to justify diﬀerential treatment: “RSA- jeunes
will be reserved for those who have  work ed
in the past. These young people  deserve that
the nation rewards their eﬀorts.”20 It relies on
the principle that rewards should be alloca-
ted in return for a certain eﬀort.  Eﬀort is lin-
ked to Oorschot’s notion of “control”: the
more control a person has over his or her si-
tuation, the more eﬀort he or she can legiti-
mately be required to show. Oorschot’s
notion of “attitude” also links with eﬀort.
People believe that the better the attitude
you have, the more deserving you are.21
Drawing on these criteria and compa-
ring the young to the elderly helps in
 understanding why young people appear to
lack the essential desert basis of eﬀort. Old
people are disabled by their ageing, over
which they have no control. By contrast,
young people are able and thus have more
power over their lives. Moreover, old people
are thought to be “undemanding, grateful
and not rebellious”.22 Young people, on the
other hand, are often depicted in the media
as rebellious, ungrateful, lazy or self-cen-
tred.23 Thus young people who step up and
make eﬀorts to provide for themselves de-
serve a reward; the others do not. RSA-jeu-
nes, by requiring two years of work, is
framed so that it protects the meritocratic
ideal of eﬀort.
However, eﬀort is only meaningful if
young people have control over their situa-
tion, and if it is their attitude that causes
their deprivation. Yet, when we look at the
current job market, it is diﬃcult to claim
that unemployed young people are entirely
responsible for their situation. Young people
may be physically able, yet in the current
economic situation they are handicapped by
the crisis, and at great risk of unemploy-
ment. Even Sarkozy recognises that “young
people of today have to face the challenges of
a world in crisis – a crisis for which they are
not responsible.”24 If young people do not
entirely control their situation, then an in-
come support scheme should at least be ad-
justed to take into account their resulting
precarious situation.
Furthermore, even if eﬀort is a fair de-
sert basis, it is very diﬃcult to assess. In fact,
the energy, concentration and perseverance
someone has applied to a task are not always
correlated with the results he or she gets. As-
sessing eﬀort requires an understanding of
the whole path someone has taken, and it is
even harder to know whether young person
x is more, equally, or less deserving than
young person. Moreover, as Van Parijs
points out, the problem with conditionality
based on an account of merit is that some
deserving people are always overlooked. Yet,
according to him, this is worse than alloca-
ting income support to undeserving per-
sons.25 This is one more reason to believe
that merit is not an authoritative rationale
to justify the denial of income support to
young people.
I have tried to show that the desert-
based account of distributive justice does not
account eﬀectively for the denial of the ori-
ginal RSA to young people. Therefore I
agree with the Haute Autorité de Lutte con-
tre les Discriminations (HALDE) that the
diﬀerential treatment is discriminatory – the
distinction gives rise to an important social
inequality26 – and yet cannot be eﬀectively
accounted for by a desert-based account of
distributive justice. According to the
HALDE, such a discrimination based on age
is legitimate “only if it is justified objectively
and reasonably, i.e. if it pursues a legitimate
goal and if the ratio between the means em-
ployed and the goal pursued is reasonable.”27
Consequentialist arguments
From a consequentialist standpoint, no mat-
ter who really deserves what, “the right act in
any given situation is the one that will pro-
duce the best overall outcome.”28 If denying
the original RSA to young people brought
about a better cost/benefit ratio than its ex-
tension, then discriminating against young
people would be legitimate. In other words,
if allocating income support to young
people brought about adverse consequences,
then denying young people RSA would be
justifiable. Indeed, Sarkozy specifically re-
ferred to the detrimental consequences that
an extension of the original RSA would pro-
voke: he argued that it would render young
people dependent and teach them the wrong
values.29 I have identified three fundamen-
tal consequentialist concerns for the exten-
sion of the original RSA to young people,
which support the view that denying bene-
fits to young people is legitimate because it
maximises social utility. 
Paternalistic argument
The paternalistic argument is based on the
very common idea that work is fundamental
for our wellbeing. Sarkozy’s concern is alleg -
edly primarily motivated by a concern for
the sake of young people themselves. He ap-
peals to the common intuition that “any job
is better than no job” and thus that
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“Reciprocity rests on a willingness to
be part of the social fabric. A retiree
displays it by pointing at past
 achievements; a young person  displays
it by her intention, in a  forward-look ing
way, to reciprocate, by a willingness to
work, to study, etc.”
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 employment among young people must be
promoted. Many would agree that work is
valuable instrumentally because, in general,
it protects people from poverty, gives them a
sense of self-worth, and permits them to
make friends and develop a social network.30
Yet, this both applies to young people and
to adults, so why would it justify young
people been treated diﬀerently? Let us admit
for a second that more paternalistic incenti-
ves are legitimate with respect to young
people, because they have not yet establis-
hed a reason able view of what a good life en-
tails. The state would thus have a duty to
compel them, because participation in work
is a  reason able and well-shared vision of part
of the good life. 
Even if this is true, there is still a case to
be made against more incentives to work for
young people. There are alternatives to em-
ployment that may prove more fulfilling, re-
warding and will bring better outcomes in
the long-term than a bad job. Some jobs
tend to be demeaning, exploitative and un-
recognised and thus can be more destructive
than rewarding. These tend to result in a loss
of self-confidence.31Thus, for the paternalis -
tic argument to work, it will have to show
that the loss of self-confidence resulting
from a bad job is better than that resulting
from not being employed. 
Moreover, there are several alternatives
to inactivity for young people such as edu-
cation, volunteering, and interning. These
might improve young people’s skills and ac-
complish a better sense of self-worth than
some bad jobs.  Thus it seems that the
maxim “any job is better than no job”
should be nuanced; and even more so
among young people, since there are alter-
natives that may prove more fulfilling and
bring about better long-term outcomes than
employment. As a result, RSA-jeunes’ in-
centive, which exclusively focuses on paid
employment, cannot be justified solely on
paternalistic grounds.
A mix between concerns for young
people’s wellbeing and for taxpayers may be
more successful in justifying more restrictive
support. Young people’s wellbeing should be
compatible with the community’s in terest:
“when a person works there are also gains to
the taxpayer (lower benefits and more taxes)
and higher profit to employers. This is a
powerful case for getting the unemployed
into work, even if the work is not ideal.”32
Moreover, consequentialism requires that we
give equal weight to the interests of
everyone.33 The question of whether the
 denial of RSA is legitimate is thus dependent
on determining whether imposing a higher
burden on taxpayers is legitimate. In this
way, the following two arguments may be
more eﬃcient since they link concerns for
the young with societal concerns.
Dependence argument
The dependence argument rests on the idea
that the extension of RSA to young people
would be detrimental to young people and
to the whole of society since it would pro-
mote idleness. Sarkozy justified the denial of
the original RSA to young people by stating
that it “would contribute to institutionalis -
ing a dependency culture among young
people”.34 RSA-jeunes alleviates dependence
since its eligibility is restricted to young
people who have worked in the past; they
seem to be the least likely to become idle.
Benefits can trap both adults and young
people in poverty, yet here again we will as-
sume that more incentives on young people
are legitimate because the state has a re-
sponsibility to push young people forward –
this seems legitimate to the extent that the
decisions taken by young people at this stage
of their lives are likely to be fraught with
consequences. Moreover, it is clear that
young people’s contribution is more essen-
tial than that of their parents; a 20 year old
is expected to contribute at least 40 years of
work while a 40 year old is only expected to
work a further 20 years. Thus the poverty
trap may be more damaging in the long run
when young people are aﬀected, all the more
when the ratio of young/old people is con-
stantly decreasing. Thus the dependence
 argument may hold more authority in the
treatment of youth unemployment.
Intuitively, it seems that some young
people on benefits will not develop an am-
bitious and active spirit – to move to places
where there is work, to search for training,
or to escape an unpleasant job – while they
would have done so without benefits.
 Mongin argues that if students were to be al-
located a minimum income “it would un-
dermine the incentive to succeed in exams,
to select demanding fields, to quit education
for professional life after a reasonable
time.”35 But, are these intuitions reasonable?
Is the benefit trap a suﬃciently objective
force in the world to justify denying a mini-
mum income to most poor young people?
Many sociologists have strongly argued
against the emphasis on benefits to explain
the persistence of dependence among certain
groups. They explain why individuals are
and stay on benefits through a systemic ap-
proach – structural causes aﬀecting people’s
abilities to work (for instance, living in re-
mote places or within areas where unem-
ployment is particularly high, lacking
training, looking after someone, or being
sick36). Moreover, a surprisingly high num-
ber of people work, even though they do not
earn more than they would receive on bene-
fits. Several sociologists, such as Hartley
Dean from the Centre for the Analysis of
Social Exclusion, thus conclude that the fear
of a dependency culture is based on a “dis-
cursive rather than objective phenome-
non”.37 Therefore there is a critical lack of
evidence to support the view that benefits
themselves trap people in inactivity and en-
gender a dependency culture amongst
young people. As such, the dependency
 argument is not suﬃcient to justify the di-
scrimination.
Responsibility argument
The responsibility argument is the last argu-
ment I have identified against the extension
of the original RSA to young people. Sar-
kozy argued that the original RSA would
undermine young people’s sense of respon-
sibility. For him, promoting responsibility
matters all the more given that autonomy is
on the line. Autonomy is “the faculty for
each of us to make his own choices and to
assume them, for the counterpart of the pos-
sibility to choose is the responsibility of the
choice that you make.”38 Thus developing a
strong sense of responsibility is fundamental
for young people’s personal development as
autonomous agents.
However, I believe that there are two
diﬀerent dimensions of responsibility that
concern the French public authorities: when
they care about responsibility, they care
about both (i) responsibility as autonomy –
as taking on the costs of one’s choices; and
(ii) responsibility as solidarity – as caring for
the community.
I think that the allocation of income
support to young people may promote res -
ponsibility (ii) as willingness to care for the
community. Indeed, within a family struc-
ture, having been funded and cared for suﬃ-
ciently to flourish might result in a strong
desire to reciprocate in the future: by provi-
ding for your own children, and by provi-
ding for your elders. Similarly, one could
argue that young people “sponsored” by the
state in their projects will develop an acute
sense of reciprocity, and thus of responsibi-
lity towards the very community that has
Intergenerational Justice Review
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supported them. Thus the extension of the
 original RSA to young people may well pro-
mote (ii) – that is, responsibility as solidar ity. 
However, what about (i) responsibility
as autonomy? One might argue that RSA
cannot be a desirable solution if it slows
down young people’s development as auto-
nomous agents. The American scholar Ma-
rina Oshana defines an autonomous person
as an agent “who directs or determines the
course of her own life and who is positioned
to assume the costs and the benefits of her
choices”.39Thus, like Sarkozy, Oshana con-
siders that responsibility for assuming the
costs of one’s choices is required for auto-
nomy.40 
However, autonomy cannot be reduced
to responsibility. It also requires a certain
control over one’s “choices, actions and
goals”.41 Thus, autonomy is linked to those
skills that allow people to create opportuni-
ties. Being responsible is merely the formal
part of personal autonomy, but people need
a more substantial autonomy in order to
make free choices. 
“Real autonomy”, according to Nicolas
Farvaque, refers to the “capability, i.e. the
potential eﬀectively to achieve personal
goals.”42 His concept is very close to what
Van Parijs calls real freedom,43 and, like Van
Parijs, Farvaque argues that guaranteed in-
come support is required for real autonomy.
Real autonomy demands capabilities, and if
a minimum income is not suﬃcient for this,
it is at least required, since money increases
the set of choices available to a person.
Money can be transformed into a plurality
of opportunities; it thus potentially addres-
ses the situation of many young people.
Thus, extending RSA to young people with -
out more restrictions than adults is necessary
to promote young peoples’ real autonomy.
Consequently, the obsession of the French
government with responsibility is misplaced
and does not entail the denial of RSA to
young people. 
To sum up, it is true that extending the
original RSA to young people may result in
a welfare loss for those who will choose un-
employment over activity, while RSA-jeunes
does not bear such costs because it strongly
incentivises employment. However,  RSA-
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jeunes disincentivises alternatives which can
better maximise young people’s wellbeing
and future outcomes than  employment; it is
likely to reinforce inequality of opportunity,
since only those from disadvantaged back-
grounds will be incentivised to work; addi-
tionally, it may not promote young people’s
responsibility as solidarity and their real au-
tonomy, whereas the extension of the origi-
nal RSA would deliver these benefits.
Therefore the consequentialist arguments
that I have analysed are not suﬃcient to
 justify the denial of RSA to young people
who need it. The empirical data supporting
the oﬃcial discourse was very scarce and the
concepts used – such as responsibility, auto-
nomy and dependence – were not suﬃ-
ciently defined and thus led to
contradictions and misconceptions. As a
 result, I believe that the denial of full RSA to
young people is an illegitimate discrimina-
tion.
Conclusion: 
a case for intergenerational justice
Do these conclusions only stand outside of
a climate of economic austerity? Does this
refutation of the arguments require an ideal
and perfectionist conception of justice,
which therefore may be opposed by real
 politicians in a non-ideal political world
 subject to the rules of scarcity? I will now try
to point out one way to argue that even in a
context of economic austerity, the extension
of a minimum income is required for the
achievement of, on the one hand, (1) social
justice and eﬃciency and on the other (2)
intra- and intergenerational justices.
(1) The prudential lifespan account: 
reconciling social justice and eﬃciency
Drawing from Rawls, Norman Daniels44
 developed a framework to establish what in-
tergenerational justice requires: the “ prud-
ential lifespan account”. Since justice
requires fairness, this question cannot be
answered under particular circumstances.
The democratic game may maximise the in-
terests of the taxpayers at a given point in
time and this may undermine long-term
 social eﬃciency and justice as fairness.
 Daniels argues that intergenerational policy-
makers should blind themselves to their age
and ask which institutions are prudent over
a lifespan. In other words, he asks what a
person behind a veil of ignorance would
want to secure for each stage of her life. One
of the conclusions that Daniels’s prudence-
based account draws out is that we must
 preserve a “normal” range of opportunities
throughout the lifespan. Prudence requires
that at any age, and especially when we are
most vulnerable, we are still free to make
choices; this leads us back to the need for
“real autonomy”. Securing such autonomy
would require, for instance, the procure-
ment of a secure income for our old age.
In the same way, young adulthood is a
key moment in a lifespan. Although the
young are able-bodied, they are vulnerable
in the sense that investments in future
 opportunities need to be made right then
and there. Jonathan Wolﬀ45 argues that
what matters most about disadvantage is its
 clustering. If we were all equally  disadvantag ed
at one or two things, then disadvantage
would not be much of a problem. However,
society is such that some disadvantages are
corrosive – they yield further disadvantages.
Prudence thus seems to require identifying
corrosive disadvantages and acting upon
them. This view sheds some light on the
type of vulnerability from which young
people suﬀer. Disadvantage at this age is
 likely to provoke a clustering of disadvan-
tage over a lifespan. Just like it makes sense
to tackle child obesity rather than deal with
the clustering of its consequences during
adulthood, tackling poverty and powerless-
ness among young adults is necessary if we
are to avoid severe consequences in the
 future.  In this way, Louis Chauvel46 worries
about what he calls the “scarring eﬀect” –
i.e. the fact that the conditions of entry into
the labour market influence one’s career (in-
come, unemployment risks) over one’s
 entire life course. We can also realistically
worry that the cohort of young people today
will face higher social inequalities in the fu-
ture, higher rates of social exclusion, depres-
sion, suicides, etc. These young people,
scarred by poverty and unemployment, will
become  resentful, frustrated, depressed and
eventually abandon fighting; we can only
imagine the disastrous consequences it will
have on society as a whole.
These consequences of youth depriva-
tion suggest that it is very likely that not
dealing with youth poverty, which aﬀects 1
million poor young people today, will also
end up being more costly in unemployment
benefits, social exclusion and the cluster of
consequences arising from them. Thus it is
ineﬃcient in the long-term to deny a mini-
mum income to young people in need. The
prudential lifespan account tells us that in-
tergenerational justice requires maximising
young people’s capacity to make free choices
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in the name of fairness and long-term social
eﬃciency, even in a climate of economic
austerity, or, rather, especially in a climate of
austerity. In other words, if we want fully
“functioning” adults in Sen and Nussbaum’s
sense, we need to endow the young with the
capabilities that will promote their real free-
dom. Prudence brings together a deontolo-
gical view of distributive justice, understood
as fairness, with a utilitarian concern for
 eﬃciency over a lifespan.
(2) The facilitation hypothesis:47 reconciling
intra- and intergenerational justice
Finally, I believe that our case study has
taught us something fundamental about the
alleged competition between two kinds of
justices: inter- and intragenerational justices.
I do not believe that there is a way to be con-
clusive about their complex rivalries and
connections, and the answer probably lies in
assessing the plurality of specific cases.  How -
ever, I believe that two conclusions can be
drawn from my specific case study. These
conclusions are in line with what Glotzbach
and Baumgärtner48 refer to as the facilitation
hypothesis: “Achieving intragenerational
 justice will improve our chances of achieving
intergenerational justice. Achieving inter -
generational justice will also help in securing
intragenerational justice.”49
First, focusing on young people allows
the reconciliation of pressing concerns for
the worse oﬀ with longer-term issues.
 Philosophers interested in intergenerational
justice often focus on challenges arising from
responsibilities towards future unborn
people. However, I believe that focusing on
young people is an eﬃcient way to address
indirectly our duties towards future people.
Therefore one question I want to ask is the
following: what capabilities, rights, institu-
tions and goods are necessary for young
people to be able to tackle and survive to-
morrow’s challenges? My hypothesis is that
the main capability to promote is what  Nic -
olas Farvaque refers to as “real autonomy”,
the “capability, i.e. the potential eﬀectively
to achieve personal goals.”50 In this context,
income support seems to stand as a particu-
larly appealing measure, which both meets
the requirements of justice between con-
temporary generations and promotes the
 interests of future generations. 
Second, when it comes to the option of a
minimum income for young people, it seems
that meeting the requirements of inter -
generational justice improves our chances of
meeting the requirements of  intragenerational
justice. While most inequalities within age-
groups have fallen in France, they have in-
creased within the 18–24 age-group.51 The
current benefits system urges young people
from poor families to take on low-paid jobs to
meet their needs while others are able to
 aﬀord studies, internships and other activities
which will enhance their capabilities and
 opportunity set. This is all the more worry-
ing in that we know that young people can-
not even find these low-paid jobs easily and
that unemployment rates are, on average,
more than twice as high for those without a
higher education diploma than for those who
have completed two years of higher educa-
tion.52 A recent study led by the OVE –
French  Observatory of student life – has
shown that the number of working-class chil-
dren in higher education is decreasing al-
ready. Even in the more technological and
professional fields that were initially designed
for students from disadvantaged back-
grounds, the proportion of young people
whose  parents were working-class, farmers or
 employees dropped from 42% to 34%
 between 2006 and 2010.53
Equality of opportunity is generally un-
derstood as a fundamental principle of intra-
generational justice; yet promoting equality
of opportunity necessarily requires taking
into account the transmission of goods from
one generation to the other. Consequently,
counteracting an unfair intergenerational de-
terminism is our best chance to reduce intra-
generational inequalities of opportunity. As a
result, it is highly likely that allocating a mi-
nimum income to young people, as well as
other social institutions and goods, will im-
prove our chances of achieving both justices.
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